By Joseph Raz
What are our tasks or rights? How may still we act? What are we chargeable for? How will we make certain the solutions to those questions? Joseph Raz examines and explains the philosophical concerns underlying those daily quandaries. He explores the character of normativity--namely, the truth that we think and think we must always behave in definite methods, the reasoning in the back of definite ideals and feelings, and diverse easy good points of creating judgements approximately what to do. He is going directly to think about once we are accountable for our activities and omissions, and gives a unique account of accountability. we will consider accountability for unjustified activities or attitudes as a precondition of the blameworthiness of anyone for an perspective or an motion, or maybe for an entire set of activities, intentions, or ideals. accountability for justified activities or attitudes could be a precondition of praiseworthiness. both method accountability may well aspect to additional outcomes of being justified or unjustified, rational or no longer. yet crucially, accountability attaches to humans in a extra holistic means. a few everyone is chargeable for their activities, whereas others aren't. during this approach, Raz argues that the tip is first and foremost, in figuring out how individuals are topic to normativity, particularly the way it is that there are purposes addressed to them, and what's the that means of that for our being within the world.
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Extra info for From Normativity to responsibility
71 Barnett marks this divergence between contract and promise not just within but at the very threshold of contract. 72 Moral rigorists might deny the requirement of this meta-intention, just as they might deny the validity of meta-intentions regarding remedies, reasoning thus: a promise creates a moral obligation that is other-regarding—it creates a moral duty to another, and the promisor has no moral business denying the promisee the ability to enforce that obligation. This is indeed similar to the objections to contractual clauses limiting the remedy to the forfeiture of a small deposit or requiring arbitration before a religious panel.
2 See notes 34–6. 18 Charles Fried But at the end of the day (or 30-plus years) I still believe that Contract as Promise is correct to locate as the generating genius of this body of law the promise principle, the moral invention that facilitates human collaboration by self-imposed moral obligation. I In the late 1970s, when Contract as Promise was written, there were two views of contract in the field: a traditional, doctrinal, and not particularly theorized view that saw contract as the law’s way of allowing private parties to create and enforce the terms that would govern transactions and long-term undertakings,3 and a critical literature that saw contract law as a tool of social control imposing obligations on parties growing in part, but only in part, from dealings into which they had voluntarily entered.
Any rule like Posner’s efficient breach rule would then come into play as one of several default rules, supplied by the court in the absence of party specification. 46 The law does, it must be admitted, take Shiffrin’s side to the extent that such remedial specification is subject to greater scrutiny and control by the courts than are substantive terms. 48 But it is hard to see how such limitations—at least as applied to sophisticated parties—accord with the general principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy.